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Author SHA1 Message Date
jude
8fc50531c1 Correct bib file 2023-08-20 11:16:57 +01:00
jude
94f6246547 Remove embedded tikzpictures 2023-08-20 11:04:15 +01:00
3 changed files with 38 additions and 57 deletions
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33
whitepaper/Dissertation.bib
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@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ doi={10.1109/SP.2014.36}}
@misc{monero, @misc{monero,
author = {Monero Research Lab}, author = {Monero Research Lab},
title = {What is {Monero} ({XMR})?} title = {What is {Monero} ({XMR})?},
howpublished = {\url{https://www.getmonero.org/get-started/what-is-monero/}} howpublished = {\url{https://www.getmonero.org/get-started/what-is-monero/}}
} }
@ -245,8 +245,7 @@ howpublished = {\url{https://zcash.readthedocs.io/en/latest/rtd_pages/basics.htm
@InProceedings{fiatshamir, @InProceedings{fiatshamir,
author="Fiat, Amos author="Fiat, Amos and Shamir, Adi",
and Shamir, Adi",
editor="Odlyzko, Andrew M.", editor="Odlyzko, Andrew M.",
title="How To Prove Yourself: Practical Solutions to Identification and Signature Problems", title="How To Prove Yourself: Practical Solutions to Identification and Signature Problems",
booktitle="Advances in Cryptology --- CRYPTO' 86", booktitle="Advances in Cryptology --- CRYPTO' 86",
@ -264,7 +263,7 @@ howpublished = {\url{https://zcash.readthedocs.io/en/latest/rtd_pages/basics.htm
year = {2020}, year = {2020},
publisher = {GitHub}, publisher = {GitHub},
journal = {GitHub repository}, journal = {GitHub repository},
howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/tc39/proposal-bigint}}, howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/tc39/proposal-bigint}}
} }
@misc{lzstring, @misc{lzstring,
@ -273,7 +272,7 @@ howpublished = {\url{https://zcash.readthedocs.io/en/latest/rtd_pages/basics.htm
year = {2013}, year = {2013},
publisher = {GitHub}, publisher = {GitHub},
journal = {GitHub repository}, journal = {GitHub repository},
howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/pieroxy/lz-string}}, howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/pieroxy/lz-string}}
} }
@misc{ipfs, @misc{ipfs,
@ -282,7 +281,7 @@ howpublished = {\url{https://zcash.readthedocs.io/en/latest/rtd_pages/basics.htm
year = {2023}, year = {2023},
publisher = {GitHub}, publisher = {GitHub},
journal = {GitHub repository}, journal = {GitHub repository},
howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/ipfs/specs}}, howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/ipfs/specs}}
} }
@misc{unciv, @misc{unciv,
@ -291,7 +290,7 @@ howpublished = {\url{https://zcash.readthedocs.io/en/latest/rtd_pages/basics.htm
year = {2023}, year = {2023},
publisher = {GitHub}, publisher = {GitHub},
journal = {GitHub repository}, journal = {GitHub repository},
howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/yairm210/Unciv}}, howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/yairm210/Unciv}}
} }
@misc{msgpack, @misc{msgpack,
@ -309,7 +308,7 @@ howpublished = {\url{https://zcash.readthedocs.io/en/latest/rtd_pages/basics.htm
year = {2022}, year = {2022},
publisher = {GitHub}, publisher = {GitHub},
journal = {GitHub repository}, journal = {GitHub repository},
howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/Caligatio/jsSHA}}, howpublished = {\url{https://github.com/Caligatio/jsSHA}}
} }
@article{RABIN1980128, @article{RABIN1980128,
@ -341,24 +340,15 @@ howpublished = {\url{https://zcash.readthedocs.io/en/latest/rtd_pages/basics.htm
@article{Shor_1997, @article{Shor_1997,
doi = {10.1137/s0097539795293172}, doi = {10.1137/s0097539795293172},
url = {https://doi.org/10.1137%2Fs0097539795293172}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1137%2Fs0097539795293172},
year = 1997, year = 1997,
month = {oct}, month = {oct},
publisher = {Society for Industrial {\&} Applied Mathematics ({SIAM})}, publisher = {Society for Industrial {\&} Applied Mathematics ({SIAM})},
volume = {26}, volume = {26},
number = {5}, number = {5},
pages = {1484--1509}, pages = {1484--1509},
author = {Peter W. Shor}, author = {Peter W. Shor},
title = {Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Prime Factorization and Discrete Logarithms on a Quantum Computer}, title = {Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Prime Factorization and Discrete Logarithms on a Quantum Computer},
journal = {{SIAM} Journal on Computing} journal = {{SIAM} Journal on Computing}
} }
@ -384,7 +374,7 @@ howpublished = {\url{https://zcash.readthedocs.io/en/latest/rtd_pages/basics.htm
institution = {U.S. Department of Commerce}, institution = {U.S. Department of Commerce},
address= {Washington, D.C.}, address= {Washington, D.C.},
DOI = {10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202}, DOI = {10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202},
year = {2015}, year = {2015}
} }
@inproceedings{Jurik2003ExtensionsTT, @inproceedings{Jurik2003ExtensionsTT,
@ -434,7 +424,7 @@ howpublished = {\url{https://zcash.readthedocs.io/en/latest/rtd_pages/basics.htm
title={{ECMAScript} 2024 Language Specification}, title={{ECMAScript} 2024 Language Specification},
author={ECMA}, author={ECMA},
journal={ECMA (European Association for Standardizing Information and Communication Systems), pub-ECMA: adr,}, journal={ECMA (European Association for Standardizing Information and Communication Systems), pub-ECMA: adr,},
url = {https://tc39.es/ecma262} url = {https://tc39.es/ecma262},
year={1999} year={1999}
} }
@ -453,8 +443,7 @@ howpublished = {\url{https://zcash.readthedocs.io/en/latest/rtd_pages/basics.htm
} }
@InProceedings{randomoracle, @InProceedings{randomoracle,
author="Pointcheval, David author="Pointcheval, David and Stern, Jacques",
and Stern, Jacques",
editor="Maurer, Ueli", editor="Maurer, Ueli",
title="Security Proofs for Signature Schemes", title="Security Proofs for Signature Schemes",
booktitle="Advances in Cryptology --- EUROCRYPT '96", booktitle="Advances in Cryptology --- EUROCRYPT '96",
@ -476,7 +465,7 @@ howpublished = {\url{https://zcash.readthedocs.io/en/latest/rtd_pages/basics.htm
pages = {107--120}, pages = {107--120},
url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/atc19/presentation/jangda}, url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/atc19/presentation/jangda},
publisher = {USENIX Association}, publisher = {USENIX Association},
month = jul, month = jul
} }
@INPROCEEDINGS{upnp, @INPROCEEDINGS{upnp,

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whitepaper/Dissertation.pdf
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54
whitepaper/Dissertation.tex
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@ -721,27 +721,23 @@ Consider point (1). One option is to prove that the sum of the committed values
\begin{tikzpicture} \begin{tikzpicture}
\tikzstyle{style}=[circle,minimum size=15mm,draw=black,fill=white] \tikzstyle{style}=[circle,minimum size=15mm,draw=black,fill=white]
\node (im1) {\begin{tikzpicture} \node[style] (A) at (-1.5 - 4, 3) {$n_1$};
\node[style] (A) at (-1.5, 3) {$n_1$}; \node[style] (B) at (-3 - 4, 0) {$n_2$};
\node[style] (B) at (-3, 0) {$n_2$}; \node[style] (C) at (0 - 4, 0) {$n_3$};
\node[style] (C) at (0, 0) {$n_3$}; \node[style] (D) at (1.5 - 4, 3) {$n_4$};
\node[style] (D) at (1.5, 3) {$n_4$};
\path[draw] (A) -- (C) -- (B) -- (A); \path[draw] (A) -- (C) -- (B) -- (A);
\path[draw] (A) -- (D); \path[draw] (A) -- (D);
\end{tikzpicture}};
\node (im2) at (0.5\textwidth, 0) {\begin{tikzpicture} \node[style,label=center:$n_1 + 0$] (A2) at (-1.5 + 4, 3) {};
\node[style,label=center:$n_1 + 0$] (A) at (-1.5, 3) {}; \node[style,label=center:$n_2 + 0$] (B2) at (-3 + 4, 0) {};
\node[style,label=center:$n_2 + 0$] (B) at (-3, 0) {}; \node[style,label=center:$n_3 + 1$] (C2) at (0 + 4, 0) {};
\node[style,label=center:$n_3 + 1$] (C) at (0, 0) {}; \node[style,label=center:$n_4 + 0$] (D2) at (1.5 + 4, 3) {};
\node[style,label=center:$n_4 + 0$] (D) at (1.5, 3) {};
\path[draw] (A) -- (C) -- (B) -- (A); \path[draw] (A2) -- (C2) -- (B2) -- (A2);
\path[draw] (A) -- (D); \path[draw] (A2) -- (D2);
\end{tikzpicture}};
\path[draw,->,very thick] (im1) -- (im2); \path[draw,->,very thick] (-1.5, 1.5) -- (0, 1.5);
\end{tikzpicture} \end{tikzpicture}
\caption{Example state change from reinforce action.} \caption{Example state change from reinforce action.}
\end{figure} \end{figure}
@ -896,27 +892,23 @@ Point (5) still remains, as the range proof alone only works to prevent negative
\begin{tikzpicture} \begin{tikzpicture}
\tikzstyle{style}=[circle,minimum size=15mm,draw=black,fill=white] \tikzstyle{style}=[circle,minimum size=15mm,draw=black,fill=white]
\node (im1) {\begin{tikzpicture} \node[style] (A) at (-1.5 - 4, 3) {$n_1$};
\node[style] (A) at (-1.5, 3) {$n_1$}; \node[style] (B) at (-3 - 4, 0) {$n_2$};
\node[style] (B) at (-3, 0) {$n_2$}; \node[style] (C) at (0 - 4, 0) {$n_3$};
\node[style] (C) at (0, 0) {$n_3$}; \node[style] (D) at (1.5 - 4, 3) {$n_4$};
\node[style] (D) at (1.5, 3) {$n_4$};
\path[draw] (A) -- (C) -- (B) -- (A); \path[draw] (A) -- (C) -- (B) -- (A);
\path[draw] (A) -- (D); \path[draw] (A) -- (D);
\end{tikzpicture}};
\node (im2) at (0.5\textwidth, 0) {\begin{tikzpicture} \node[style,label=center:$n_1 + k$] (A2) at (-1.5 + 4, 3) {};
\node[style,label=center:$n_1 + k$] (A) at (-1.5, 3) {}; \node[style,label=center:$n_2 + 0$] (B2) at (-3 + 4, 0) {};
\node[style,label=center:$n_2 + 0$] (B) at (-3, 0) {}; \node[style,label=center:$n_3 - k$] (C2) at (0 + 4, 0) {};
\node[style,label=center:$n_3 - k$] (C) at (0, 0) {}; \node[style,label=center:$n_4 + 0$] (D2) at (1.5 + 4, 3) {};
\node[style,label=center:$n_4 + 0$] (D) at (1.5, 3) {};
\path[draw] (A) -- (C) -- (B) -- (A); \path[draw] (A2) -- (C2) -- (B2) -- (A2);
\path[draw] (A) -- (D); \path[draw] (A2) -- (D2);
\end{tikzpicture}};
\path[draw,->,very thick] (im1) -- (im2); \path[draw,->,very thick] (-1.5, 1.5) -- (0, 1.5);
\end{tikzpicture} \end{tikzpicture}
\caption{Example state change from fortify action.} \caption{Example state change from fortify action.}
\end{figure} \end{figure}
@ -1083,7 +1075,7 @@ The second is to associate a non-random value with a random value. In practice,
\subsection{Quantum resistance} \subsection{Quantum resistance}
Paillier is broken if factoring large numbers is computationally feasible \cite[Theorem~9]{paillier1999public}. Therefore, it is vulnerable to the same quantum threat as RSA is, known as Shor's algorithm \cite{shor_1997}. Alternative homomorphic encryption schemes are available, which are believed to be quantum-resistant, as they are based on lattice methods (e.g, \cite{fhe}). Paillier is broken if factoring large numbers is computationally feasible \cite[Theorem~9]{paillier1999public}. Therefore, it is vulnerable to the same quantum threat as RSA is, known as Shor's algorithm \cite{Shor_1997}. Alternative homomorphic encryption schemes are available, which are believed to be quantum-resistant, as they are based on lattice methods (e.g, \cite{fhe}).
\subsection{Honest-verifier} \subsection{Honest-verifier}